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Audrey J. Lynn* 
“Not my president!” That cry resounded across the nation in the 
wake of the 2016 election of Donald Trump, the second Republican 
candidate in the past two decades to ascend to the presidency despite 
receiving a minority of individual votes cast.1 Disappointed voters and 
disempowered politicians clamor against the two-century-old system as 
an anti-democratic relic of institutionalized slavery. Too impatient to 
endure through the arduous process of amending the Constitution, several 
states and the District of Columbia have voted to join the National Popular 
Vote Interstate Compact. If the Compact goes into effect, they will give 
their own electoral votes to the candidate who wins a majority of the 
nationwide popular vote.2 Not satisfied with leading by example, the 
drafters of the Compact purposefully crafted it so that it will take effect 
only if enough states join that the member states control 270 votes, the 
number a presidential candidate must obtain to win. Thus, the members 
could dictate that the winner of the nationwide popular vote would 
become president, even though the remaining states have not agreed to be 
governed in this manner, and the people of the member states have not 
agreed to forfeit their states’ voice should they see things differently than 
the majority. 
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1. See infra notes 58, 60 and accompanying text.
2. “[T]he National Popular Vote compact would require that each member state award its
electoral votes to the presidential candidate who received the largest number of popular votes in all 
50 states and the District of Columbia.” JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL 258 (2013), 
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/sites/default/files/eve-4th-ed-ch6-web-v1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/473Z-V7UC]. 
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The irony that an initiative designed to right the supposed wrong that 
the Electoral College “takes the votes of the minority in individual states 
and awards those votes . . . to the candidate they opposed”3 would itself 
do far worse by awarding all a state’s votes to a candidate most of its own 
voters may have opposed, is exquisite. This Compact is an open attempt 
to subvert the constitutionally prescribed method of selecting the 
president by syphoning off the voting power of other states and 
aggrandizing it to the members. It is equally an assault on foundational 
principles of popular sovereignty in that each member would renege on 
its duty to its own people and cede their rightful choice to outsiders. 
Unsurprisingly, this perverse initiative is purely partisan in its inception,4 
but growing support for the Compact gives the debate over the continued 
validity of the Electoral College a new urgency.5 The nebulous 
philosophical arguments and arcane statistical models that have 
historically characterized the debate are no longer enough.6 Faced with 
3. Neal R. Peirce, Foreword to GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS 
BAD FOR AMERICA, at x (2004); see also EDWARDS at 36. Dr. Edwards is University Distinguished 
Professor Emeritus of Political Science and Jordan Chair in Presidential Studies at Texas A&M 
University. 
4. Thus far, every one of the members is a solidly “blue state” that designated all its electoral 
votes to the Democratic candidate in both the 2000 and 2016 elections. (In 2016, member states 
Hawaii and Washington had a few “faithless electors” who cast a vote for a third-party candidate.) 
Election for the Fifty-Eighth Term, 2017-2021, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, 
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/votes/2000_2005.html#2016 
[https://perma.cc/J3AK-54GS]. The current members are California, Colorado, Connecticut, District 
of Columbia, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New Mexico, New 
York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each 
State, NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE!, https://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state-status 
[https://perma.cc/TX3F-CFZF]. In both elections, the Democratic candidate received more of the 
overall popular vote than the Republican. See infra notes 58, 60 and accompanying text.  
5. According to National Popular Vote, Inc., the Compact has been introduced as a bill in
every state. Since drafting of the article began in early 2019, Delaware has passed such a bill. 
Additionally, both chambers of Nevada’s legislature voted in favor of entering the Compact; however, 
the governor vetoed the bill. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, supra note 4. 
6. This article cannot conceivably address every argument that has been made for and against 
the Electoral College, nor is that its purpose. The author is convinced that such debate has reached an 
intellectual stalemate. There will always be little-d democrats and little-r republicans no matter what 
anyone says. Nevertheless, because this article purports to provide a new mathematical perspective, 
it is important to give prior scientific efforts due recognition. In general, opponents of the Electoral 
College disfavor it because they believe it violates the “one person, one vote” principle applicable in 
congressional elections. Williams v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 288 F. Supp. 622, 623–28 (E.D. 
Va. 1968), aff’d, 393 U.S. 320 (1969) (per curiam); William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairing 
the Electoral College, 22 J. LEGIS. 145, 161–66 (1996) (explaining that courts have declined to apply 
this principle to presidential elections). In effect, they argue, the Electoral College results in people 
from different states having different “voting power,” thus violating the principle of political equality. 
These arguments appear to have their scholarly origins in the early work of John F. Banzhaf, III, 
creator of the “Banzhaf Index” and famous legal activist. John F. Banzhaf, III, GEO. WASH. L., 
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reactionary efforts to undermine or discard the system, the nation needs 
more objective answers. 
This article seeks to provide that objectivity. It answers three 
essential questions: what was the electoral system intended to do, what 
has it done, and what is the best (or worst) it can do?7 It answers these 
questions using a unique approach that measures the electoral system’s 
success and potential in terms that correspond to its raison d’être, 
parameterizing the problem in terms of satisfaction and population instead 
of voters. Also in contrast to traditional expositions, this article dispenses 
with “highly stylized”8 and voter-based statistical models. It instead 
correctly recognizes the Electoral College as a discrete mathematical 
system and applies much simpler and more meaningful descriptive and 
predictive techniques to actual election data. The result is that the system’s 
effect on elections is quantified, related to historical data, and reliably 
forecast for the foreseeable future. This is the type of substantive analysis 
long needed to confirm or disprove the system’s merits. 
Part I first examines records of the Constitutional Convention 
seeking to determine the Framers’ purpose in choosing the algorithm they 
did. Concluding that their purpose was to provide a president who would 
be representative of people across the country, the article proceeds with a 
focus on people and places to examine whether the system has achieved 
its goal. Beginning with the first election in which there was a registered 
popular vote, Part II briefly describes the few discrepancies there have 
https://www.law.gwu.edu/john-f-banzhaf-iii [https://perma.cc/HGP8-W8H4]. See, John F. Banzhaf 
III, One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College, 13 VILL. L. REV. 304 
(1968); John F. Banzhaf III, Weighted Voting Doesn’t Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 317 (1965). While such arguments sound persuasive to ears habituated to democratic rhetoric, 
they have a fatal flaw if taken as an evaluation of the Electoral College’s merits. The principle of 
political equality is not violated unless one imposes the false premise that people are voting for the 
president. They are not. They are voting to direct their electors how to cast their votes. Political 
equality requires only that constituents of the same body politic have voting power equal to one 
another’s. There is no requirement that individual constituents of different bodies politic have the 
same influence on extra-jurisdictional events.  
7. Because almost all states have a “winner-take-all” approach to allocating their electoral
votes and have almost since the beginning, Josephson & Ross, supra note 6, at 162, this article 
proceeds under the assumption that each state will cast all of its electoral votes for the same candidate. 
Presently, only Maine and Nebraska allow their electoral votes to be divided between candidates. 
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/electoral-college/faq.html [https://perma.cc/Z9JG-TLN5]. A few split votes have occurred in 
the past, Josephson & Ross, supra note 6, at 161, and a few “faithless electors,” have caused a wrinkle. 
See Faithless Electors, FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/faithless_electors 
[https://perma.cc/HH95-Y5LP].  
8. Jonathan N. Katz et al., Empirically Evaluating the Electoral College 14 (Cal. Inst. of
Tech., Working Paper No. 1134, 2002), https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79795/1/sswp1134.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/42H7-XXUV]. 
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been between the popular and electoral vote in order to fairly characterize 
the basis for controversy. Its novel contribution, however, is to propose 
and apply a framework for assessing whether the Electoral College results 
in an effective expression of the will and interests of the People that is 
consistent with the legitimizing principles of our government. Part III 
concludes with a mathematical analysis that proves that there are specific, 
calculable limitations on the size and distribution of a prevailing minority 
and illustrates that there is a continuing likelihood that winning candidates 
will be selected by states comprising a majority of the population. 
I. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BORN 
Records of the Constitutional Convention indicate that the delegates’ 
most significant concern centered on separation of powers, specifically, 
ensuring that the president would be independent of the legislature (the 
most feared branch of government at the time). The pervasive sentiment 
was a desire to ensure that the executive would not be a political pawn9 
but a person of character and merit who would protect the interest of all 
the union. As this section will show, the delegates’ views on what method 
of election would be most likely to produce an independent, upright 
president differed widely. After months of debate, however, the delegates 
had to acknowledge that no existing proposal adequately addressed their 
third and final goal; none was likely to consistently produce a president 
whom people across the country could accept. There was only one 
solution that addressed all their concerns and reconciled all their values: 
an electoral college. 
The initial proposal, presented at the Convention on May 29, 1787 
by Edmund Randolph (Va.), provided that the president would be selected 
by Congress.10 Counterproposals were made by James Wilson (Pa.) and 
John Rutledge (S.C.).11 Wilson was “in favor of an appointment by the 
people” and Rutledge suggested that the executive should be selected by 
the “second branch only of the national legislature.”12 Wilson refined his 
proposal the next day, then indicating that the purpose of his proposal was 
9. See LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEAL R. PEIRCE, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER 2000, 
18–19 (1999) (pointing out that “there existed strong opposition to this plan on the grounds that this 
would make the chief executive subservient to Congress and unable to develop an independent 
leadership capacity”). 
10. Madison Debates, May 29, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_529.asp [https://perma.cc/N6WN-F98Q]. 
11. Madison Debates, June 1, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_601.asp [https://perma.cc/SJ7H-BUD6]. 
12. Id. While the exact meaning of “second branch” is vague, it likely refers to the Senate. 
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to avoid state interference in the election and give people confidence in 
the “first magistrate.”13 Elbridge Gerry (Mass.) liked the idea in principle 
but was concerned about superseding state authorities.14 He proposed 
using state-appointed electors as an alternative.15 No one liked that idea, 
yet, and the delegates voted in favor of election by the legislature.16 Mr. 
Gerry was not pleased, and a week later proposed that the executive be 
elected “by the Executives of the States whose proportion of votes should 
be the same with that allowed to the States in the election of the Senate.”17 
Now Mr. Randolph was not pleased. Among a litany of other dreads, he 
objected that “[t]he confidence of the people would not be secured by it 
to the Nat[ional] magistrate. The small States would lose all chance of an 
appoint[ment] from within themselves.”18 Thus, as of June 13, the plan 
remained unchanged.19 New Jersey’s delegation thereafter introduced a 
plan that also provided for election by the legislature.20 
It was Alexander Hamilton (N.Y.) who identified the most serious 
flaw in existing proposals and reintroduced the idea of using electors to 
resolve it.21 “The great question is what provision shall we make for the 
happiness of our Country? . . . The [first] great [and] essential principle[] 
necessary for the support of Government [is] an active [and] constant 
interest in supporting it.”22 In order to ensure the success of the 
presidency—indeed, of the national government itself—it was critical to 
draw candidates “from the extremes to the center of the Community,” 
chosen by a process that originated with the People.23 Hamilton was 
concerned that no other plan would be ratified.24 His recommendation was 
13. Madison Debates, June 2, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_602.asp [https://perma.cc/U6E3-MMV7].  
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Madison Debates, June 9, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_609.asp [https://perma.cc/9V6T-U6L5]. 
18. Id. 
19. Madison Debates, June 13, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_613.asp [https://perma.cc/3QXC-W2PV].  
20. Madison Debates, June 15, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_615.asp [https://perma.cc/9D8V-FEQA]. 
21. Madison Debates, June 18, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_618.asp [https://perma.cc/KDG8-52E9]. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. Hamilton’s electors would have been chosen by the people directly.
24. Id. 
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not met with any enthusiasm, and the delegates again voted in favor of 
election by the legislature.25 
Debate reopened on the subject a month later with Gouverneur 
Morris (N.Y.) calling for popular election.26 Morris saw this as the best 
way to ensure that the president would “be the great protector of the Mass 
of the people.”27 Roger Sherman (Ct.) believed “that the sense of the 
Nation would be better expressed by the Legislature, than by the people 
at large.”28 Charles Pinkney (S.C.) was stunned that this was still an issue. 
Popular election was “liable to the most obvious [and] striking 
objections,” he thought.29 The people would “be led by a few active [and] 
designing men. The most populous States by combining in favor of the 
same individual will be able to carry their points.”30 And so on and on 
they went without resolution. Another motion was made in favor of using 
electors. It was defeated.31 
Eventually, however, the delegates sensed opinion shifting toward 
“an election mediately or immediately by the people.”32 At this point, 
James Madison interjected his agreement that election by the legislature 
would violate essential principles of separation of powers.33 He believed 
direct election by the People would “produce an Executive Magistrate of 
distinguished Character,” as “[t]he people generally could only know 
[and] vote for some Citizen whose merits had rendered him an object of 
general attention [and] esteem,” without making the president overly 
dependent on any other branch of the government. Madison recognized, 
however, that 
There was one difficulty . . . of a serious nature attending an immediate 
choice by the people. The right of suffrage was much more diffuse in 
the Northern than the Southern states; and the latter could have no 
influence in the election on the score of the Negros. The substitution of 
25. Madison Debates, June 19, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_619.asp [https://perma.cc/JDC2-97AJ].  
26. Madison Debates, July 17, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_717.asp [https://perma.cc/N8HY-ZKXR].  
27. Madison Debates, July 19, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_719.asp [https://perma.cc/A6R8-NLFL]. 
28. Madison Debates, July 17, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_717.asp [https://perma.cc/T7MF-JD3U]. 
29. Id.
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Madison Debates, July 19, supra note 27. 
33. Id.
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electors obviated this difficulty and seemed on the whole liable to the 
fewest objections.34 
Much has been made of this comment by those who insist the 
Electoral College exists solely because of slavery and is, therefore, 
outmoded.35 It is notable that at the time Madison made this comment, no 
one had introduced any proposal regarding how to compute the number 
of electors to which each state would be entitled or determine their votes.36 
Madison lacked any specific information that could have caused him to 
believe the system would be sure to favor slaveholding states.37 
Furthermore, the two delegates who had proposed using electors were 
from states where slavery was widely disfavored and on the decline.38 
34. Id. 
35. See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1145, 1147, 1155–57 (2002). 
36. A brief time afterward, Oliver Elseworth (Ct.) proposed a roughly proportional system that 
would have given one, two, or three electors to each state depending on population. Madison Debates, 
July 19, supra note 27. 
37. Remarkably, the Electoral College was never responsible for the election of a pro-slavery 
president against the popular will. Between 1828 and the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment in 
1865, there were no flipped elections. See Historical Timeline, 270TOWIN.COM, 
https://www.270towin.com/historical-presidential-elections/timeline/ [https://perma.cc/DV5P-
SZWX]. Martin Van Buren (1836), Zachary Taylor (1848), James Buchanan (1856), and Abraham 
Lincoln (1860) received a plurality of popular votes and a majority of electoral votes. Id. Martin Van 
Buren, was opposed to slavery and ran as a third-party candidate with the Free Soil party in 1848. 
Martin Van Buren [1782–1862], NEW NETHERLAND INSTITUTE, 
https://www.newnetherlandinstitute.org/history-and-heritage/dutch_americans/buren-martin-van/ 
[https://perma.cc/5DUM-3AVL]. Although a slave owner himself, Whig president Zachary Taylor 
vigorously opposed the expansion of slavery into new territories and was prepared to counter southern 
secession by force. Zachary Taylor, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-
white-house/presidents/zachary-taylor/ [https://perma.cc/9HDL-92MF]. James Buchanan’s views on 
the issue were complex. See Donald V. Weatherman, James Buchanan on Slavery and Secession, 15 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 796 (1985) (discussing Buchanan’s personal and political views on slavery). 
Of the four, he could most properly be classified as pro-slavery. His opponents in 1856 were the first-
ever Republican presidential candidate John C. Frémont, recognized for his staunch anti-slavery 
views, and Vice President Millard Fillmore, who is possibly best known for his vigorous enforcement 
of the Fugitive Slave Act. See Zach Garrison, Frémont, John C., CIV. WAR ON THE WESTERN 
BORDER: THE MO.-KAN. CONFLICT, 1855-1865, https://civilwaronthewesternborder.org/
encyclopedia/frémont-john-c [https://perma.cc/L5AU-2AWK]; Michael Holt, U.S. Presidents / 
Millard Fillmore, U. VA. MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/president/fillmore 
[https://perma.cc/K9HX-VQ9F]. It is worth noting that a large majority of the popular vote went to 
the two slavery-friendly candidates. Historical Timeline, supra. In 1860, Abraham Lincoln was most 
closely followed in the vote count by the adamantly pro-slavery Stephen Douglas. Douglas suffered 
a humiliating defeat in the Electoral College while Lincoln walked away with a decisive victory. Id. 
38. Slavery lost legal protection in Massachusetts in 1781 when a series of lawsuits held that
slavery was inconsistent with the Commonwealth’s constitution. Rebecca Beatrice Brooks, Slavery 
in Massachusetts, HISTORY OF MASS. BLOG (Dec. 20, 2012), https://historyofmassachusetts.org/
slavery-in-massachusetts/ [https://perma.cc/J6UD-ACP8]. New York had a long and complex 
relationship with slavery but had never been a plantation economy like the southern states. The 
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Thus, this particular comment does not strongly support the conclusion 
that pro-slavery sentiment was a primary motive force for adopting an 
electoral system. 
The discussion of how to select the executive continued for several 
more days without progress. Questions of whether the president should be 
elected by the national legislature and whether a president should be 
eligible to hold office more than once were the almost exclusive subjects 
of debate during this period.39 Other serious concerns included the 
possibility of foreign influence and a perceived preference for local 
candidates.40 On July 25, Madison more fully expounded his view: 
The option . . . lay between an appointment by Electors chosen by the 
people-and an immediate appointment by the people. [Madison] thought 
the former mode free from many of the objections which had been urged 
ag[ain]st[] it, and greatly preferable to an appointment by the Nat[ional] 
Legislature. . . . This Mode however had been rejected so recently [and] 
by so great a majority that it probably would not be proposed anew. The 
remaining mode was an election by the people or rather by the qualified 
part of them, at large: With all its imperfections he liked this best. He 
would not repeat either the general argum[en]ts[] for or the objections 
ag[ain]st[] this mode. He would only take notice of two difficulties 
which he admitted to have weight. The first arose from the disposition 
in the people to prefer a Citizen of their own State, and the disadvantage 
this [would] throw on the smaller States. Great as this objection might 
be he did not think it equal to such as lay ag[ain]st[] every other mode 
which had been proposed. He thought too that some expedient might be 
hit upon that would obviate it. The second difficulty arose from the 
disproportion of qualified voters in the N[orthern] [and] S[outhern] 
abolitionist spirit was strong in the state even during the Revolutionary period, when Gouverneur 
Morris had proposed gradual abolition as a constitutional provision. See generally DAVID N. 
GELLMAN, EMANCIPATING NEW YORK, 1777-1827 (2006). Hamilton himself abhorred slavery and 
worked to end it in his state. See, e.g., Ankeet Ball, Ambition & Bondage: An Inquiry on Alexander 
Hamilton and Slavery, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 
https://columbiaandslavery.columbia.edu/content/ambition-bondage-inquiry-alexander-hamilton-
and-slavery [https://perma.cc/6JY6-LH7K]; see also Michael D. Chan, Alexander Hamilton on 
Slavery, 66 REV. POL. 207 (2004). New York passed a gradual abolition law in 1799. When Did 
Slavery End in New York State? NEW YORK HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 
https://www.nyhistory.org/community/slavery-end-new-york-state [https://perma.cc/3CDP-C2VW]. 
39. Madison Debates, July 20, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_720.asp [https://perma.cc/9GEC-SC33]; Madison Debates, July 21, THE 
AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_721.asp [https://perma.cc/
KT2H-GH5Y]; Madison Debates, July 23, THE AVALON PROJECT, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_723.asp [https://perma.cc/QWX4-HNMF]; 
Madison Debates, July 24, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_724.asp [https://perma.cc/4HJN-K6TJ]. 
40. Id. 
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States, and the disadvantages which this mode would throw on the latter. 
The answer to this objection was 1. that this disproportion would be 
continually decreasing under the influence of the Republican laws 
introduced in the S[outhern] States, and the more rapid increase of their 
population. 2. That local considerations must give way to the general 
interest. As an individual from the S[outhern] States he was willing to 
make the sacrifice. 41 
In sum, Madison, a southerner, a slave holder, favored popular 
election even though it would theoretically make it less likely that a 
southerner would be elected president. Whether he believed it or not, he 
never expressed the opinion that an electoral system would be 
advantageous to the South or that it was necessary because of slavery. 
Madison’s prediction that the southern states would eventually adopt 
“Republican laws,” by which he presumably meant they would outlaw 
slavery and expand suffrage, reflects a presumption that helped convince 
many to ratify the constitution without solving the slavery problem.42 But 
not all small-state delegates were satisfied with Madison’s reasoning.43 
Oliver Ellsworth (Ct.), responded that the advantage direct election would 
give large states was an “unanswerable” problem, a non-starter in modern 
vernacular.44 Thus, as of August 6, the proposed constitution still provided 
that “His Excellency” would be elected by Congress.45 
41. Madison Debates, July 25, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_725.asp [https://perma.cc/3JHG-K5WJ] (emphasis added). 
42. See, e.g., The Constitution and Slavery, CONST. RTS. FOUND. (2019), http://www.crf-
usa.org/black-history-month/the-constitution-and-slavery [https://perma.cc/2L7V-RN7Y] 
(explaining that “[m]ost [northern states] saw slavery as a dying institution with no economic future,” 
a belief that proved inaccurate as a result of the invention of the cotton gin a few years later). 
43. At least one credentialed author has asserted that “in all the debates over the executive at
the Constitutional Convention, this issue [of placating small states] never came up.” Finkelman, supra 
note 35, at 1150. Dr. Finkelman has a Ph.D. in history and is currently the president of Gratz College. 
Paul Finkelman, Ph.D., GRATZ COLLEGE, https://www.gratz.edu/college-faculty-staff-executive-
team/paul-finkelman-phd [https://perma.cc/GW66-LA23]. With all due respect to his academic 
accomplishments, his assertion is bewildering. The records of the Convention are riddled with 
concerns about ensuring meaningful small-state involvement in the presidential selection process, 
many of which are referenced in this article. It is true that “[n]o mention was made in the Convention 
records of the advantage given to the small states by giving all states two senatorial counterpart 
electors,” but “James Madison did write later that the presidential election provisions were the ‘result 
of compromise between the larger and smaller states, giving to the latter the advantage of selecting a 
President from the candidates, in consideration of the former in selecting the candidates from the 
people.’” Josephson & Ross, supra note 6, at 153. 
44. Madison Debates, July 25, supra note 41. Connecticut had adopted a gradual abolition law 
in 1784. See Slavery and Abolition, CONNECTICUTHISTORY.ORG, https://connecticuthistory.org/
topics-page/slavery-and-abolition/ [https://perma.cc/7CLK-88SQ]. 
45. The plan provided that
[t]he Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a single person. His stile shall 
be, “The President of the United States of America;” and his title shall be, “His 
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There was no more discussion of the mode of electing the president 
until September 4. On that day, Mr. Brearly reported a revision drafted by 
the committee to which the matter had been referred on August 31:46 
He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and together with 
the vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected in the following 
manner, viz. Each State shall appoint in such manner as its Legislature 
may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators 
and members of the House of Representatives to which the State may be 
entitled in the Legislature. The Electors shall meet in their respective 
States, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not 
be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves . . .47 
A collective sigh must have erupted from certain quarters of the room. 
The notes record that “Mr. Randolph [and] Mr. Pinkney wished for a 
particular explanation [and] discussion of the reasons for changing the 
mode of electing the Executive.” Morris responded with these specific 
reasons: 
The [first] was the danger of intrigue [and] faction if the appoint[ment] 
should be made by the Legislature. 2. [T]he inconveniency of an 
ineligibility required by that mode in order to lessen its evils. 3. The 
difficulty of establishing a Court of Impeachments, other than the Senate 
which would not be so proper for the trial nor the other branch for the 
impeachment of the President, if appointed by the Legislature, 4. No 
body [sic] had appeared to be satisfied with an appointment by the 
Legislature. 5. Many were anxious even for an immediate choice by the 
people. 6. [T]he indispensable necessity of making the Executive 
independent of the Legislature. As the Electors would vote at the same 
time throughout the U. S. and at so great a distance from each other, the 
great evil of cabal was avoided. It would be impossible also to corrupt 
them.48 
The new proposal was a compromise, a fresh attempt to resolve the 
delegates’ previously insurmountable concerns about ensuring executive 
independence and a sufficient popular mandate. It combined executive 
Excellency.” He shall be elected by ballot by the Legislature. He shall hold his office 
during the term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second time. 
Madison Debates, August 6, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_806.asp [https://perma.cc/E9G8-ADG2]. 
46. Madison Debates, August 31, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_831.asp [https://perma.cc/ZA4P-3FTB]. See LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 
9, at 18. 
47. Madison Debates, September 4, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_904.asp [https://perma.cc/98XB-UVHD]. 
48. Id. (emphasis added). 
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independence and a degree of proportionality while still capturing the 
equal status of the states and the merits of popular election.49 The 
delegates, hard to please as ever, continued to discuss concerns about 
“cabal and corruption,” re-eligibility, and ensuring the independence and 
good character of the president, but they made no reference to slavery’s 
impact or viability.50 Notably, at no point did any delegate from a large 
state express the slightest concern that his state would be inadequately 
represented by this scheme. 
After resolving how to conduct contingent elections, a matter which 
also entailed concerns about the influence of large states, the ideologues 
on both sides conceded. The next few days produced minor alterations to 
other sections, but there was again no further debate on how to elect the 
president. On September 17, the Convention approved a final draft 
providing for the Electoral College, as it would come to be known.51 That 
plan was ultimately ratified by the States.52 The essence of the electoral 
49. Award-winning author and political scientist Dr. Gary L. Gregg has summarized the
compromise this way: 
The Electoral College was to be a method of electing the president that in many ways 
would closely resemble the constitutional system writ small. The selection of a good man 
to be president, it was hoped, would work similarly to the way good public policy was 
supposed to emerge from the political system—that is, through the efforts of the most 
qualified people working under conditions that would encourage mature discussions. In 
the case of the political system, the desired end was public policy that would not threaten 
the system or any one part of it and would further the national good. Likewise, it was 
hoped that the Electoral College would result in a president with the qualifications and 
interests necessary to serve the public well. Properly understood, the Electoral College and 
its origins point to the ideas and values that undergird the entire American constitutional 
system as these were embedded in the foundations of the Electoral College itself.  
Gary L. Gregg II, The Origins and Meaning of the Electoral College, in SECURING DEMOCRACY: 
WHY WE HAVE AN ELECTORAL COLLEGE 1, 12 (Gary L. Gregg II ed., 2001). 
50. Madison Debates, September 4, supra note 47; Madison Debates, September 5, THE 
AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_905.asp [https://perma.cc/
6KDY-3H2F]; Madison Debates, September 6, THE AVALON PROJECT, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_906.asp [https://perma.cc/Y7UA-EEJY]. 
51. Madison Debates, September 17, THE AVALON PROJECT, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/
18th_century/debates_917.asp [https://perma.cc/QJ4V-4ZH5]. 
52. As ratified, 
The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He 
shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, 
chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows 
Each state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number 
of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State 
may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an 
Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector. 
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system adopted in the Constitutional Convention survived subsequent 
amendments to Article II and remains today unaltered.53 
This article has fairly described the process whereby the concept of 
an Electoral College came into being. It appears that no exacting 
mathematical standard was in play. The system was created to reconcile 
philosophical differences. The Framers were of one mind that the voice of 
the People was necessary, and ultimately decided that it could be best 
expressed through electors. As to the issue of motivation and political 
purpose, it is not the intention of this article to suggest that the 
Convention’s implicit truce on slavery was not essential to the ultimate 
ratification of the Constitution, or that the fact of slavery’s existence did 
not provide some impetus for the institution of the Electoral College. To 
do so would be untruthful. Equally untruthful, however, is the insinuation 
that these were the dominant considerations that undergird the system’s 
design. Unfortunately, the Framers did not outlive the odious and 
embarrassing institution of slavery, and we do not have the benefit of their 
wisdom in an emancipated nation. We simply do not know what they 
would have done under different circumstances. But one thing is certain: 
they built the Constitution to last. The electoral system was designed to 
ensure that the president would be, as it is so often put nowadays, the 
President of all America. 
Thankfully, our conception of what demographics constitute “all 
America” for political purposes has become much more defensible since 
that time. Melanin and chromosomes are no longer official metrics for 
rights and social status. As was so often the case, the Framers’ goals, 
admirable in the abstract, were hindered and their solutions marred by the 
then-unavoidable presence of pervasive race- and sex-based oppression 
endemic to the culture of the time. But these crumbling obstacles should 
not obscure our vision of the Electoral College’s potential. It is now 
positioned better than ever to achieve its essential and only valid 
purpose—to provide a President who would be representative of people 
across the country.54 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. See also, Madison Debates, September 4, supra note 47 (showing that the 
current language is substantially similar to the process recommended during the Constitutional 
Convention). 
53. By “essence” is meant the algorithm for computing the number of electors for each state.
Of course, each of the original states has a different number of electors than at that time, states have 
changed how they select electors and assign votes, and the electors themselves go through a 
substantially different voting process.  
54. Many authors have argued that because the Framers never envisioned a winner-take-all 
system with bound electors in which Congress rarely plays a role in selecting the president, it has 
never functioned as it was meant to and for that reason belongs in the dustbin of history. See, e.g., 
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II. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE MISBEHAVES?
Critics of the Electoral College allege that it has been “misbehaving” 
by producing outcomes that are inconsistent with the popular vote.55 Five 
elections form the principle evidentiary basis for these complaints. Twice 
on the heels of the Civil War a United States presidential candidate who 
received a majority of the popular vote was defeated. In 1876, “one of the 
most hostile, controversial campaigns in American history” resulted in a 
one-vote victory for Rutherford B. Hayes.56 In 1888, William Henry 
Harrison lost the popular vote by just half a percent.57 In no other instance 
has a winner of a majority of the popular vote lost the election. Only two 
plurality vote-getters have lost because of the Electoral College. Half a 
percentage point separated the leading candidates in 2000.58 That election 
spurred on the present antithetical movement.59 Most recently in 2016, 
plurality winner Hillary Rodham Clinton faired two percent better at the 
polls than the ultimate winner, the characteristically provocative Donald 
Trump.60 Trump’s victory represents the biggest upset of the popular vote 
in the history of the country since the opposition’s oldest exhibit: John 
Quincy Adams’ defeat of Andrew Jackson in a contingent election.61 
LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 9, at 24–27; NEAL R. PIERCE, THE PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT: THE 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT-VOTE ALTERNATIVE 296–98 (1968). 
That argument is not quite right. The system operates within its original parameters. It does not do 
anything it did not originally have the capacity to do; in particular, it did not award all a state’s 
electoral votes to the same person. Whether or not the Framers anticipated that metamorphosis, they 
intentionally gave states complete freedom in their choice of electors. It is no argument against the 
system that states figured out how to use it to maximize their influence.  
55. LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 9, at 27. 
56. Frequently Asked Questions on the 1876 Election, RUTHERFORD B. HAYES PRESIDENTIAL 
LIBRARY & MUSEUMS, https://www.rbhayes.org/hayes/frequently-asked-questions-on-the-1876-
election/ [https://perma.cc/5U42-YCLX]. A vote of 185-184 in the Electoral College made Hayes the 
winner over Samuel Tilden. Hayes received 48.4% of the popular vote. 1876 Presidential Election, 
270TOWIN, https://www.270towin.com/1876_Election/ [https://perma.cc/V4E4-38RB]. 
57. Harrison won 233-168 but lost the nationwide popular vote by the narrowest of margins,
carrying 49.6%. 1888 Presidential Election, 270TOWIN, https://www.270towin.com/1888_Election/ 
[https://perma.cc/85W7-MT86]. 
58. George W. Bush defeated Al Gore 271-266. Ralph Nader received no electoral votes. Bush 
carried 48.4% of the popular vote and Gore carried 48.9%. 2000 Presidential Election, 270TOWIN, 
https://www.270towin.com/2000_Election/ [https://perma.cc/C3PT-WZ82]. 
59. TARA ROSS, ENLIGHTENED DEMOCRACY: THE CASE FOR THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 9 
(2004). “Calls to abolish the Electoral College are not new,” but many popular as well as scholarly 
objections are premised on fundamental misunderstandings. Id. at 5-10; see infra notes 90, 92.  
60. Trump defeated Clinton 304-227. Trump got 46.5% of the popular vote while Clinton
garnered 48.6%. 2016 Presidential Election, 270TOWIN, https://www.270towin.com/2016_Election/ 
[https://perma.cc/D2VA-C2Y6]. 
61. No candidate received a majority of the electoral votes. Jackson garnered 99, Adams, 84,
William Crawford, 41, and Henry Clay, 37. Jackson got more of the popular vote than Adams; 
153,544 votes to Adams’ 108,740. About 250,000 votes were cast “against” Adams. The choice 
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Historically, the main philosophical concern that has arisen out of 
these five incidents is that the Electoral College is anti-democratic. 
Essentially, the argument is that because the Electoral College does not 
produce results that satisfy the very specific ideal of complete consistency 
with a majority of equally weighted votes, the Electoral College is a bad 
thing.62 In a sense, though, opponents of the Electoral College spend a 
great deal of brain power attempting to verify the self-evident: The 
Electoral College is not democratic. The Framers had no inkling that 
electoral votes would ever be credited on the basis of a popular vote or 
that states would almost uniformly adopt a winner-take-all approach. It is 
true that in its current form the system gives rise to the possibility that a 
minority of the population can control a majority of the electoral votes63 
and, as discussed above, that a majority of popular votes does not 
invariably equate to a majority of electoral votes and vice versa. Yet, as 
demonstrated below, these obnoxious idiosyncrasies have not defeated the 
valid purposes of the system. 
A. Proposed Framework 
Indisputably, majority rule is an important principle. When it comes 
to the selection of lawmakers, it is the penultimate principle. With respect 
to the executive, however, our otherwise Lockean Framers did not 
consider it essential.64 Other aspirations, including a need for national 
devolved on the House of Representatives, which selected Adams. 1824 Presidential Election, 
270TOWIN, https://www.270towin.com/1824_Election/ [https://perma.cc/L78W-9TXG] (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2019). Jackson won the popular vote and the electoral vote in the next election. 1828 
Presidential Election, 270TOWIN, https://www.270towin.com/1828_Election/ 
[https://perma.cc/GJL9-73J6]. 
62. By succinctly characterizing the oppositional arguments this way, the author does not mean 
to imply that such arguments lack scholarly sophistication. The point is that the democratic ideal 
seems to be the Alpha and Omega of all opposition to the Electoral College.  
63. See infra Part III.
64. Dr. Judith Best has ventured a plausible explanation of why a majority vote standard is not 
essential in the context of electing the president: 
The consent of the governed is a necessary condition in leadership selection, but that 
consent is not always identical to the consent of the arithmetical majority of the voters. 
The people’s choice is not necessarily the majority-vote victor, if only because not all the 
people vote. And though we are making great strides to remedy the situation, not all the 
people who wish to vote can. Moreover, the plurality winner is not even the first choice of 
the majority of the voters. This is not to deny the legitimacy inherent in the majority 
principle, but only to indicate that it is a device which, in practice, operates imperfectly. . . 
JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A DEFENSE OF THE 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE 50 (3d ed. 1978). Dr. Best is currently a Distinguished Teacher of Political 
Science at SUNY Cortland. She received a Ph.D. in political science from Cornell University in 1971 
and a Masters in English Literature from the University of Michigan in 1963 and has written dozens 
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unification around the president, predominated, though slightly.65 The 
question is, does the Electoral College accomplish those predominating 
goals? Against the democratic ideal, supporters of the Electoral College 
have hitherto faithfully toed the Framers’ line, insisting that the system 
gives people from small states a say and thus helps preserve the basis of 
union. As one author has pointed out, however, these weighty policy 
arguments have not been backed by data.66 A new mathematical 
framework is needed to advance the discussion. 
Data that would support the continuing validity of the Electoral 
College would demonstrate two things: the system achieves its purpose 
and the results it produces are consistent with legitimate governance. 
Every region’s voice is being heard if every state’s preferred candidate 
wins a substantial portion of the time. The electoral system is legitimate 
if it produces a sufficiently high rate of voter satisfaction to indicate that 
the People are being governed by consent. Historical state-by-state 
election results demonstrate that, over time, the Electoral College has 
satisfied both of these criteria. 
B. Effective Expression Verified 
Appendix I contains the data for this analysis. The information is 
based on election results by state since 1828.67 The 1824 election has been 
disregarded because it was not decided by the Electoral College. Table 1 
displays how many times each state has cast electoral votes for the 
winning presidential candidate during each of the following periods: 
1828–2016, 1912–2016, and 1964–2016. The beginning date of each 
period corresponds to the first effective popular vote, the first election in 
which all forty-eight contiguous states voted (roughly the past century), 
and the first election in which all 50 states and the District of Columbia 
voted (reflecting current conditions), respectively. Table 2 shows the 
percentage of states that were on the winning side in each election year. 
of books and articles on the Electoral College as well as other constitutional topics. Faculty/Staff 
Detail: Judith Best, SUNY CORTLAND, http://www2.cortland.edu/departments/political-
science/faculty-staff-detail.dot?fsid=314342 [https://perma.cc/RD3X-H3SY]. 
65. It should be abundantly clear that the Framers did not intend to remove the voice of the
People from the process, as some critics have asserted. See ROSS, supra note 59, at 41–42 (pointing 
out that even a Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court has made this erroneous assertion). 
As Dr. Best has observed, that would not be a valid position to take. BEST, supra note 64, at 50–51. 
66. EDWARDS, supra note 3, at xvii. There have been some attempts to defend the Electoral 
College using statistical methods. See, e.g., Katz et al., supra note 8. 
67. Historical Election Results, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/electoral-college/votes/votes_by_state.html [https://perma.cc/T3RF-NHQ9].  
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Drawing on the information in these tables, it is possible to calculate 
the frequency with which the average state has cast its electoral votes for 
the candidate that ultimately won the election. That win rate is roughly 
equivalent to the frequency with which the candidate chosen by the 
majority of voters in an average state became president.68 For each period, 
the average state’s win rate is consistently just under seven wins per ten 
elections.69 Equivalently, on average, a majority of voters in an average 
state is happy with the outcome of the election approximately 70% of the 
time. Furthermore, in only three elections has the prevailing candidate 
been selected by the vote of half the states or fewer.70 Contrastingly, the 
average number of states on the winning side has been thirty. Since 1912, 
that number has been thirty-six and since 1964 it has been 35.5. Most 
impressively, every state has been on the winning side in at least half the 
elections in which it has participated.71 This fact, together, with an overall 
high win rate, verifies the assertion that the constitutional system has 
protected the interests of all states and fostered amity within the Union. 
Of course, these summary statistics represent only a correlation 
between the existence of the Electoral College and widespread 
satisfaction. They do not show that the Electoral College caused it, nor, 
standing alone, can they. Additional extensive studies might reveal 
whether the rates and distributions described above contrast with the 
historical popular vote, but any conclusions drawn therefrom concerning 
the relative merits of the system would be suspect, as it is not possible to 
say that the popular vote would have been the same under altered 
circumstances. Part III provides a basis for proving causation that requires 
no logically specious methods. 
68. For winner-take-all states, it is equivalent. There are a few instances in which a state has
cast electoral votes for more than one candidate. See supra note 7. See generally Historical Election 
Results, supra note 67 (reporting the electoral votes of each state in each election). 
69. The frequency is calculated by dividing the total number of states that cast their votes for
the winner during that period divided by the corresponding number of opportunities to vote. Each 
state has one opportunity to vote in each election year. Thus, the number of opportunities each election 
year is equal to the number of states in the Union at that time. The number of opportunities over a 
period of time is the sum of the number of states in the Union each election year. (Note that no 
adjustment has been made for the fact that several states did not participate in 1864. Such an 
adjustment would raise the overall frequency by a few tenths of a percent). During any period in 
which the number of states did not vary, this frequency is simply the average number of times each 
state won divided by the number of elections. See infra Appendix I, Table 1. 
70. In 1848, the votes of 15 of the 30 states placed Zachary Taylor in the White House. John
F. Kennedy was elected in 1960 by the votes of only 23 of the 50 states. In 1976, Jimmy Carter 
received the electoral votes of 23 states and the District of Columbia. See infra Appendix I, Table 2.  
71. The District of Columbia has been on the winning side in six out of the fourteen elections 
in which it has participated. See infra Appendix I, Table I. 
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III. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, MATURED
It has been shown that the vast preponderance of successful 
presidential candidates has had broad-based appeal. To this end, the 
Electoral College has occasionally sacrificed the preference of the 
majority as expressed by the popular vote. To reiterate, in only four of the 
nation’s presidential elections has the candidate with the greatest number 
of popular votes lost due to the allocation of electoral votes. In two of 
those four, no one received a majority of the popular vote. It may 
reasonably be argued that this sacrifice is inappropriate in principle, but it 
cannot be intelligently argued that it is not worth it unless the severity of 
the risk can be quantified and contrasted with the magnitude of the benefit 
of the Electoral College.72 Accordingly, this article now turns to provide 
a basis for that comparison. 
A. The Senate Bump Quantified 
Disproportionality between the popular and electoral vote is mainly 
due to the two electoral votes every state receives in addition to those 
assigned to it based on its population. As it turns out, the “Senate bump” 
can be expressed both as a percentage that does not depend on population 
and as number of people that does.73 It is possible to derive a formula 
indicating what portion of the population must live in a given number of 
states in order for those states, by voting together, to be assured victory in 
the Electoral College.74 For simplicity, a subset of the states will be called 
a “B group.”75 There is a unique multiplier associated with each B group 
which, for brevity, this article will refer to as its “b coefficient.”76 This 
article focuses on validating the philosophical principles of the electoral 
72. Previous authors have recognized that it is probably not “sheer luck [that] has saved the
nation from a series of runner-up presidencies” and identified facts and characteristics of the system 
that inductively support that conclusion, but they have not developed the mathematical formula to 
prove their reasonable inferences. See BEST, supra note 64, at 57–80. 
73. It is important to note that the formulation in this section does not establish any boundaries 
as to what the popular vote count will look like. There is no guarantee that voter turnout rates will be 
uniform throughout the country or that the number of votes cast in each state will be proportional to 
its share of the overall population. If the appearance of things affects people’s confidence in the 
system, this is a reasonable concern. High turnout across the nation would help minimize misleading 
disparities between the electoral vote and the popular vote and is desirable for that reason, among 
others. 
74. Throughout, population refers to the population as of the census resulting in the
apportionment in place at the time of the presidential election in question. 
75. For reasons no better than that the author used the letter “B” to denote “big states” in the 
initial drafting phase. 
76. A table listing all the b coefficients is provided in Appendix II.
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system, and for that reason will provide an example calculating how many 
individuals must live in the “big states” in order for those states to be able 
to control more electoral votes than the remaining small states. This will 
enable a more objective evaluation of the system’s fairness and make it 
possible to have an educated discussion about any adjustments that may 
need to occur. The formula, however, will work for any combination of 
states, as nothing about it depends on which states form the B group. For 
example, it could tell us how many people the census must identify in so-
called blue states in order for Democratic victory in the next presidential 
election to be assured, or in red states in order for the Republican 
candidate to rest easy. In general, it can quantify how much more or less 
than 50% of the population it takes for any given voting bloc of states to 
prevail. That extra portion is the Senate bump quantified, and is calculable 
as the product of a b coefficient and the total population of the 50 states. 
The formula’s derivation has been provided in Appendix III.77 For 
now, only three simple definitions are needed: PB is the total population 
of the B group, b is the number of states in the B group, and P is the 
population of the 50 United States. A win in the Electoral College is 
guaranteed if b states that cast all their electoral votes for the same 
candidate had, at the time of apportionment, a total population of  
�
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 >  12𝑃𝑃 + �103−3𝑏𝑏870 �𝑃𝑃 if D.C. votes against the B group, or
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 >  12𝑃𝑃 + �97−3𝑏𝑏870 �𝑃𝑃 if D.C. votes with the B group,
Similarly, if b states have a population 
�
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 <  12𝑃𝑃 + �103−5𝑏𝑏870 �𝑃𝑃 and D.C. votes against the B group, or
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 <  12𝑃𝑃 + �97−5𝑏𝑏870 � 𝑃𝑃 and D.C. votes with the B group
these states will not be able to win even if they cast all their electoral votes 
for the same candidate. 
B. Example 
As of the 2010 census, the total population of the 50 states was 
308,143,815. Seventeen states had a population greater than the average.78 
77. See infra Appendix III.
78. Resident Population Data, UNITED STATES CENSUS 2010, https://web.archive.org/
web/20101225031104/http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-pop-text.php 
[https://perma.cc/3UND-R5J6] (excluding the District of Columbia). See infra Appendix IV, Table I. 
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Together, they were home to some 70% of the U.S. population, about 216 
million people. In fact, more than half the U.S. population lived in the 
largest ten.79 The 17 form the B group for this example.80 The formula 
tells us to what extent the Electoral College could have mitigated or 
suppressed these big states’ influence. 
Applying the formula, we can see that the answer is two-fold. First, 
the solution below shows that in order to control the 2012 election, those 
17 states needed to be inhabited by just under 56% of the total U.S. 
population as of 2010:  
�
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 >  12𝑃𝑃 + �103−3×17870 �𝑃𝑃 ≅  12𝑃𝑃 + 0.060𝑃𝑃 =  154,071,908 + 18,417,719 =  172,489,699
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 >  12𝑃𝑃 + �97−3×17870 �𝑃𝑃 ≅ 12𝑃𝑃 + 0.053𝑃𝑃 = 154,071,908 + 16,292,661 = 170,364,569 
Thus, under the electoral system, in order to dictate the outcome of 
the presidential election of 2012, the big states needed to be home to 16.3–
18.4 million extra residents (5.3–6.0% of the population) above and 
beyond what they would have needed in a popular vote system. 
The second part of the answer is that the electoral system would not, 
in this scenario, have negatively impacted the big states’ influence on the 
election. Their actual population dwarfed the Senate bump. Voting as a 
group, they could, despite the electoral system, have determined the 
outcome of the election without a single vote being cast in any other state. 
C. Systemic Boundaries 
The apparent ease with which heavily populated states can carry an 
election despite their constitutional handicap urges the question of just 
how much the Electoral College helps smaller states. After all, the nation 
did just experience one of the largest upsets in presidential politics in 
history, with President Trump receiving only 46.5% of the popular vote, 
so it must do something meaningful.81 On that note, a few summary facts 
describe the entire objective basis for comfort or concern about the 
Electoral College:82 
79. Id. 
80. This example works from the assumption that all 17 could have gone to the same candidate 
in order to simply and clearly illustrate the situation. In reality, not all 17 went to the same candidate.  
81. See, 2016 Presidential Election, supra note 60. 
82. The tables in Appendix II contain values of every size B group. However, there are certain 
groups that are merely theoretical. For example, it is inconceivable that one or two states would ever 
contain half the population. In order to help the reader understand the foreseeable real-world extrema 
of the electoral system’s influence, the following assumptions have been made: (1) Scenarios that 
require more than more than half the population to live in five or fewer states are unrealistic. (2) 
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1. Sixty percent of the population will always control 270 or
more electoral votes.83
2. Any majority spread across 35 states, or 33 and the District
of Columbia, will control 270 electoral votes.84
3. No minority smaller than 46% will ever be guaranteed 270
electoral votes.85
4. No minority that is spread across fewer than 35 states, or 33
and the District of Columbia, will ever be guaranteed to
control 270 electoral votes.86
5. No minority can ever control 270 electoral votes unless it is
spread across at least 21 states, or twenty if D.C. has the
same presidential preference.87
6. A minority of about 40% distributed across approximately
40 states is the smallest that could conceivably control 270
electoral votes.88
D. Consistent Performance Ensured 
Graphing the guaranteed and minimum win percentages versus the 
corresponding number of states provides a visual of what the Electoral 
College does: 
Scenarios that imply over 60% of the population lives in fewer than ten states are unrealistic. These 
assumptions are made in light of the fact that in 2010, just over half the population lived in the largest 
ten states. It may be possible to refine these assumptions based on additional (past or future) census 
data. See infra Appendix IV. 
83. See infra Appendix II, Table 1.
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. See infra Appendix II, Table 2.
87. See infra Appendix II, Table 2 and note 87.
88. See infra Appendix II, Table 2. For every B group, there is a range of populations between
the figures corresponding to a guaranteed loss and guaranteed win that could, but do not necessarily, 
entitle the B group to 270 electoral votes. This is a purely theoretical problem that exists because we 
are dealing with generic groups of states. It is possible, as proven, to say what is the absolute minimum 
B group population that could ever control 270 electoral votes. To try to say more than that is not 
especially helpful. It suffices at present to say that small-minority and concentrated-minority win 
scenarios are incredibly unlikely to take place. See infra Appendix III, Chart 2. 
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Chart 189 
Region I: Widespread majorities 
Popular vote: B groups in this region could always win. 
Electoral vote: B groups in this region almost always control 270 
electoral votes. 
Region II: Concentrated majorities 
Popular vote: B groups in this region could always win. 
Electoral vote: B groups in the region usually control 270 electoral 
votes; small B groups with moderate majorities are disadvantaged. 
Region III: Concentrated minorities 
Popular vote: B groups in this region never win unless voter  turnout 
rates were lower in other states. 
Electoral vote: B groups in this region have almost no chance of 
controlling 270 electoral votes. 
Region IV: Widespread minorities 
Popular vote: B groups in this region could never win unless voter 
turnout rates were lower in other states 
Electoral vote: There is a moderate chance that large B groups will 
control 270 electoral votes. 
89. A table listing all data for this chart is provided in Appendix II.
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A B group will win if it falls above relevant guaranteed-win line and 
will lose if it falls below its minimum-win line. B groups that fall in the 
middle region might or might not control 270 electoral votes. This region 
is meaningful only to illustrate possible future scenarios. Once a census 
takes place and representation is apportioned for the ensuing ten years, 
there are no longer any theoretical B groups. A given subset of states either 
controls 270 votes during that period or it does not. The gray regions 
represent the unrealistic scenarios described in footnote 82. 
Chart 1 shows in the abstract how the Electoral College skews win-
loss potential. Chart 2 shows how it can impact real-life elections: 
Chart 290 
All real B groups exist on or between the two population curves. 
More data is needed to determine how consistently shaped the population 
curves are across time, but short of some catastrophic event, they will 
always look something like these. If population disparities become more 
extreme, the curvature will be more pronounced, and the significance of 
the Electoral College will be enhanced. If small states’ populations grow 
90. Tables listing all the data for this chart is provided in Appendices II, IV.
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faster than large states, the curves will approach one another, minimizing 
the potential impact of the electoral system. 
We can see that the impact of the Electoral College on widespread 
majorities, Region I, is near-negligible. Looking at Region II, we can see 
that the Electoral College makes only a small fraction of concentrated-
majority win scenarios impossible and jeopardizes another small 
proportion. For example, the Electoral College presently eliminates the 
ability of the nine or ten largest states to control the election, but every 
other combination of the b largest states that would probably win under a 
popular vote system still can. In Region III, as in Region I, the Electoral 
College has little to no impact. Concentrated minorities have virtually no 
chance of prevailing, though that tiny triangular “possible” zone 
represents the extent to which the Electoral College favors large states. 
The Electoral College most significantly impacts Region IV, 
corresponding to widespread minorities. This confirms the position of 
those who say it generally favors small states. The Electoral College 
results in a handful of guaranteed wins and cognizable proportion of 
possible wins for B groups containing a large number of states and a large 
minority of the population. 
These mathematically demonstrable bounds conclusively refute 
oppositional fears that it is by sheer coincidence the Electoral College has 
not frequently contradicted the voice of the People.91 Moreover, they 
strongly indicate that the pattern observed in Part II, namely, that the 
Electoral College has produced broad-based consensus, will be perpetual. 
This is so because most winning scenarios require the candidate to appeal 
to a majority of the electorate and a large number of states. A candidate 
with a geographically concentrated base cannot win unless she is several 
percentage points more popular than the other candidate. A candidate who 
struggles in densely populated areas must compensate by attempting to 
convince a majority of the electorate in a substantial majority of states that 
he is the best choice. In a nutshell, the advantage, if any, of the electoral 
system over a popular vote is that the electoral system reduces the 
probability of geographically widespread dissatisfaction. 
91. See, e.g., LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 9, at 38 (“It has been previously argued that the 
electoral college system has continued to exist for over two centuries through a combination of 
adaptation and chance. . . . In light of the number of hairbreadth elections . . . , that only two have 
produced an electoral college deadlock, and only two or three have resulted in an electoral college 
result other than for the popular vote leader, seems remarkable indeed.”) It is remarkable, indeed, but 
because it is not the product of chance.  
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E. Interpreting Results 
The Senate bump introduces a geographical component to the 
algorithm that prizes broad-based consensus.92 For that reason, when a 
Trump-like win occurs, the 300+ electoral votes do not mean the result 
starkly contrasts with the will of the people. Interpreted properly, it 
reflects instead the distribution of different wills among the people.93 If 
anything, it is the popular vote that is most liable to misrepresent the actual 
nationwide sentiment.94 The Electoral College may have been created 
inartfully, but it has every mark of a master touch. It strikes a 
quintessentially American balance by recognizing that, when common 
values are held by individuals from across the country despite widely 
varying local interests, they should not always be shouted down by more 
numerous voices that express fewer perspectives. Yet, the republic is 
strongly democratic, and a minority must make a very strong showing in 
order to overcome. It must be a very large minority. It must demonstrate 
widespread concurrence. That is as it should be. 
CONCLUSION 
So what does all this mean? After all, isn’t the Electoral College 
ultimately “a jerry-rigged improvisation which has subsequently been 
92. Majority here meaning a majority of the population, as throughout the article. There is no 
way to in a winner-takes-all electoral system to ensure that the electoral vote mirrors the actual 
popular vote in any particular election. In that respect, the Electoral College also compensates for 
conditions that may have affected voter turnout in a particular election. For example, California would 
still get its rightful proportion of influence even if it had experienced a catastrophic earthquake the 
day before the election.  
93. See generally, JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A 
DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 206 (3d. ed. 1978) (“The electoral-count system magnifies 
the plurality winner’s margin of victory unless his appeal is sectionally concentrated and thus ensures 
the victory of candidates with broad appeal.”) Stunningly, it is not hard to find leading scholars of 
presidential politics who have ignored this fact and portrayed the Electoral College as a grossly 
imprecise system that fails to reflect the will of the electorate. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 
41–44 (suggesting that the magnitude and frequency of disparities between the popular and electoral 
vote would be of only “marginal interest” except for the fact that “the candidate who receives the 
most votes loses”). In reality, the electoral vote is finely descriptive of what the nation thinks about a 
candidate.  
94. For example, the proportion of the popular vote won by each major-party candidate in 2012 
and 2016 was grossly disproportional to the relative population of the states that favored each. If we 
take the majority vote of the states that voted for each candidate as expressing the will of those states, 
both President Obama and President Trump were representative of a majority of the population. 
Compare Appendix IV, Table 3, with supra note 56. A discussion of the reasons for such a 
discrepancy is outside the scope of this article, but it must have something to do with inconsistent 
voter turnout rates. See supra note 72 (discussing the effect of high voter participation rates on the 
consistency of the electoral and popular vote). 
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endowed with a high theoretical content”?95 No. Such dismissive 
interpretations ignore how long and hard the Framers labored over how to 
create a viable system consistent with core principles of popular 
governance. “The Electoral College is more than a hasty conclusion to a 
long summer in Philadelphia.”96 Moreover, the validity of the institution 
does not depend in the least whether it was Palladian in its conception, but 
rather on whether it has turned out to be a good thing. The Framers were 
engaged in a certain amount of speculation and theorizing, and were 
indeed tangled up in slavery’s sticky web. Hindsight, though, fully 
vindicates their plan. 
Though imperfect as every human effort, our Constitution has long 
been representative democracy’s best friend. Every American has a stake 
in its preservation and betterment. Every member of the bar and every 
member of our government is its sworn defender. Change is sometimes 
necessary; intransigence is sometimes necessary. No one ought to be 
demonized for any well-meaning initiative on either side, but sheer 
recklessness must be called out. When it comes to efforts to reform or 
defend the Electoral College, this nation has been shooting in the dark. 
That must stop. Our leadership risks killing the very thing they must 
protect at all costs. 
The Constitution’s aspirational commitment to the rights and 
interests of every person in every part of its vast jurisdiction makes union 
sustainable. Perhaps more foundational than any other principle of our 
form of government, older even than the Constitution, is the right of every 
person to be governed by consent and not by the unconstrained will of 
others who cannot always have their best interests at heart.97 Our 
predecessors concluded that neither a popular vote nor a proportional vote 
was the best way to further this principle. They instituted a surprisingly 
effective system that has consistently achieved their best goals. History 
has borne out that only rarely and by small margins does a minority 
prevail, and that a substantial majority of states generally agree on the best 
choice for president. Mathematics demonstrates that this is not a 
coincidence but a reflection of boundaries intrinsic to the constitutional 
algorithm. It assures us that minority victories will almost certainly 
continue to be rare and helps us accurately interpret margins of victory. If 
95. LONGLEY & PEIRCE, supra note 9, at 21. 
96. ROSS, supra note 59, at 51. 
97. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); ROSS, supra note 59, 
at 31–32 (recalling that the Framers knew from experience with Britain what it was like to be an ill-
treated minority and purposefully structured the government as a whole to avoid “tyranny of the 
majority”).  
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we now conclude that the Constitution has not struck the right balance 
between the rights of the majority and minority, large states and small 
states, urban areas and rural areas, or even between democracy and 
republicanism, then that should be corrected. But corrected is the key 
word. We must have informed confidence that what we do will make this 
Union more perfect. Only then can we make a responsible decision. 
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APPENDIX I98 
Table 1 displays the number of times each state has voted for the 
winning presidential candidate in each of the indicated periods (beginning 
date through 2016). The “win rate” is the number of times a state has been 
on the winning side divided by the number of presidential elections that 
have occurred since it became eligible to participate. Table 2 shows the 
number of states that voted for the winning candidate in each presidential 
election 1828. Dividing this number by the number of states extant at the 
time gives us the percentage of states on the winning side. 
Table 1 
State 
Wins 
since 
1828 
Wins 
since 
1912 
Wins 
since 
1964 
Win Rate 
Alabama 25 15 8 0.521 
Alaska 9 9 9 0.6 
Arizona 21 21 9 0.778 
Arkansas 26 19 11 0.565 
California 35 21 10 0.833 
Colorado 25 21 11 0.658 
Connecticut 34 19 9 0.708 
Delaware 32 21 11 0.667 
DC 6 6 6 0.429 
Florida 31 23 13 0.721 
Georgia 25 16 8 0.521 
Hawaii 9 9 8 0.6 
Idaho 23 21 9 0.719 
Illinois 40 22 10 0.833 
Indiana 36 18 10 0.75 
Iowa 32 20 11 0.744 
Kansas 27 18 9 0.692 
Kentucky 30 22 12 0.625 
Louisiana 30 18 10 0.625 
Maine 33 16 10 0.688 
Maryland 33 21 9 0.688 
Massachusetts 33 19 8 0.688 
Michigan 35 19 10 0.761 
Minnesota 29 18 7 0.725 
98. Historical Election Results, supra note 67. 
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Mississippi 24 14 8 0.5 
Missouri 36 24 12 0.75 
Montana 24 22 10 0.75 
Nebraska 26 19 10 0.684 
Nevada 31 25 12 0.795 
New Hampshire 36 21 11 0.75 
New Jersey 34 21 10 0.708 
New Mexico 24 24 11 0.889 
New York 38 20 9 0.792 
North Carolina 31 20 11 0.646 
North Dakota 23 18 9 0.719 
Ohio 41 25 14 0.854 
Oklahoma 20 20 9 0.714 
Oregon 29 19 9 0.725 
Pennsylvania 39 20 11 0.813 
Rhode Island 34 19 8 0.708 
South Carolina 25 16 9 0.521 
South Dakota 20 17 10 0.625 
Tennessee 31 23 12 0.646 
Texas 23 19 8 0.535 
Utah 23 20 9 0.742 
Vermont 28 15 10 0.583 
Virginia 29 20 10 0.604 
Washington 22 19 8 0.688 
West Virginia 30 21 9 0.769 
Wisconsin 33 20 11 0.767 
Wyoming 23 20 9 0.719 
Table 2 
Year Winners States* % 
1828 18 24 75.0% 
1832 17 24 70.8% 
1836 15 25 60.0% 
1840 19 26 73.1% 
1844 16 26 61.5% 
1848 15 30 50.0% 
1852 27 31 87.1% 
1856 19 31 61.3% 
1860 18 33 54.5% 
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1864 22 36 61.1% 
1868 26 37 70.3% 
1872 29 37 78.4% 
1876 21 38 55.3% 
1880 20 38 52.6% 
1884 20 38 52.6% 
1888 20 38 52.6% 
1892 26 44 59.1% 
1896 23 45 51.1% 
1900 28 45 62.2% 
1904 33 45 73.3% 
1908 31 46 67.4% 
1912 40 48 83.3% 
1916 31 48 64.6% 
1920 37 48 77.1% 
1924 35 48 72.9% 
1928 40 48 83.3% 
1932 42 48 87.5% 
1936 46 48 95.8% 
1940 38 48 79.2% 
1944 36 48 75.0% 
1948 28 48 58.3% 
1952 39 48 81.3% 
1956 41 48 85.4% 
1960 23 50 46.0% 
1964 45 51 88.2% 
1968 32 51 62.7% 
1972 49 51 96.1% 
1976 24 51 47.1% 
1980 44 51 86.3% 
1984 49 51 96.1% 
1988 40 51 78.4% 
1992 33 51 64.7% 
1996 32 51 62.7% 
2000 30 51 58.8% 
2004 31 51 60.8% 
2008 30 51 58.8% 
2012 27 51 52.9% 
2016 31 51 58.8% 
*Includes DC starting in 1964.
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APPENDIX II 
The contents of Tables 1 and 2 are described in Part III. The light 
gray text at the beginning and end of each chart represents unrealistic 
scenarios. The gray highlighting indicates the inflection point at which 
states containing a minority of the population will win (Table 1) or could 
potentially win (Table 2). Note that the coefficients and percentages will 
remain the same following the 2020 census, but the size of the “bump” 
will change. 
Table 1: Guaranteed Wins 
b b coefficient 
without DC 
“Bump” ** % of P 
Guarantees 270 
w/DC “Bump” ** % of P 
1 0.115 35,420,269 61.49% 0.108 33,295,053 60.80% 
2 0.111 34,357,661 61.15% 0.105 32,232,445 60.46% 
3 0.108 33,295,053 60.80% 0.101 31,169,836 60.11% 
4 0.105 32,232,445 60.46% 0.098 30,107,228 59.77% 
5 0.101 31,169,836 60.11% 0.094 29,044,620 59.43% 
6 0.098 30,107,228 59.77% 0.091 27,982,012 59.08% 
7 0.094 29,044,620 59.43% 0.087 26,919,404 58.74% 
8 0.091 27,982,012 59.08% 0.084 25,856,796 58.39% 
9 0.087 26,919,404 58.74% 0.080 24,794,188 58.05% 
10 0.084 25,856,796 58.39% 0.077 23,731,580 57.70% 
11 0.080 24,794,188 58.05% 0.074 22,668,972 57.36% 
12 0.077 23,731,580 57.70% 0.070 21,606,364 57.01% 
13 0.074 22,668,972 57.36% 0.067 20,543,756 56.67% 
14 0.070 21,606,364 57.01% 0.063 19,481,148 56.32% 
15 0.067 20,543,756 56.67% 0.060 18,418,540 55.98% 
16 0.063 19,481,148 56.32% 0.056 17,355,932 55.63% 
17 0.060 18,418,540 55.98% 0.053 16,293,324 55.29% 
18 0.056 17,355,932 55.63% 0.049 15,230,716 54.94% 
19 0.053 16,293,324 55.29% 0.046 14,168,107 54.60% 
20 0.049 15,230,716 54.94% 0.043 13,105,499 54.25% 
21 0.046 14,168,107 54.60% 0.039 12,042,891 53.91% 
22 0.043 13,105,499 54.25% 0.036 10,980,283 53.56% 
23 0.039 12,042,891 53.91% 0.032 9,917,675 53.22% 
24 0.036 10,980,283 53.56% 0.029 8,855,067 52.87% 
25 0.032 9,917,675 53.22% 0.025 7,792,459 52.53% 
26 0.029 8,855,067 52.87% 0.022 6,729,851 52.18% 
27 0.025 7,792,459 52.53% 0.018 5,667,243 51.84% 
28 0.022 6,729,851 52.18% 0.015 4,604,635 51.49% 
29 0.018 5,667,243 51.84% 0.011 3,542,027 51.15% 
30 0.015 4,604,635 51.49% 0.008 2,479,419 50.80% 
31 0.011 3,542,027 51.15% 0.005 1,416,811 50.46% 
32 0.008 2,479,419 50.80% 0.001 354,203 50.11% 
33 0.005 1,416,811 50.46% -0.002 -708,405 49.77% 
34 0.001 354,203 50.11% -0.006 -1,771,013 49.43% 
35 -0.002 -708,405 49.77% -0.009 -2,833,621 49.08% 
36 -0.006 -1,771,013 49.43% -0.013 -3,896,230 48.74% 
37 -0.009 -2,833,621 49.08% -0.016 -4,958,838 48.39% 
38 -0.013 -3,896,230 48.74% -0.020 -6,021,446 48.05% 
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39 -0.016 -4,958,838 48.39% -0.023 -7,084,054 47.70% 
40 -0.020 -6,021,446 48.05% -0.026 -8,146,662 47.36% 
41 -0.023 -7,084,054 47.70% -0.030 -9,209,270 47.01% 
42 -0.026 -8,146,662 47.36% -0.033 10,271,878 46.67% 
43 -0.030 -9,209,270 47.01% -0.037 11,334,486 46.32% 
44 -0.033 -10,271,878 46.67% -0.040 12,397,094 45.98% 
45 -0.037 -11,334,486 46.32% -0.044 -13,459,702 45.63% 
46 -0.040 -12,397,094 45.98% -0.047 -14,522,310 45.29% 
47 -0.044 -13,459,702 45.63% -0.051 -15,584,918 44.94% 
48 -0.047 -14,522,310 45.29% -0.054 -16,647,526 44.60% 
49 -0.051 -15,584,918 44.94% -0.057 -17,710,134 44.25% 
**Population figures based on the 2010 census.99 
Table 2: Guaranteed Losses 
b 
b coefficient 
w/o DC 
“Bump”** Min. to win 
b coefficient 
w/ DC 
“Bump”** 
Min. to 
win 
1 0.113 34,711,863 61.26% 0.106 32,586,647 60.57% 
2 0.107 32,940,850 60.69% 0.100 30,815,634 60.00% 
3 0.101 31,169,836 60.11% 0.094 29,044,620 59.43% 
4 0.095 29,398,823 59.54% 0.089 27,273,607 58.85% 
5 0.090 27,627,810 58.97% 0.083 25,502,593 58.28% 
6 0.084 25,856,796 58.39% 0.077 23,731,580 57.70% 
7 0.078 24,085,783 57.82% 0.071 21,960,567 57.13% 
8 0.072 22,314,769 57.24% 0.067 20,189,553 56.55% 
9 0.067 20,543,756 56.67% 0.060 18,418,540 55.98% 
10 0.061 18,772,742 56.09% 0.054 16,647,526 55.40% 
11 0.055 17,001,729 55.52% 0.048 14,876,513 54.83% 
12 0.049 15,230,716 54.94% 0.043 13,105,499 54.25% 
13 0.044 13,459,702 54.37% 0.037 11,334,486 53.68% 
14 0.038 11,688,689 53.79% 0.031 9,563,473 53.10% 
15 0.032 9,917,675 53.22% 0.025 7,792,459 52.53% 
16 0.026 8,146,662 52.64% 0.020 6,021,446 51.95% 
17 0.021 6,375,648 52.07% 0.014 4,250,432 51.38% 
18 0.015 4,604,635 51.49% 0.008 2,479,419 50.80% 
19 0.009 2,833,621 50.92% 0.002 708,405 50.23% 
20 0.003 1,062,608 50.34% -0.003 -1,062,608 49.66% 
21 -0.002 -708,405 49.77% -0.009 -2,833,621 49.08% 
22 -0.008 -2,479,419 49.20% -0.015 -4,604,635 48.51% 
23 -0.014 -4,250,432 48.62% -0.021 -6,375,648 47.93% 
99. See Resident Population Data, supra note 78. 
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24 -0.020 -6,021,446 48.05% -0.026 -8,146,662 47.36% 
25 -0.025 -7,792,459 47.47% -0.032 -9,917,675 46.78% 
26 -0.031 -9,563,473 46.90% -0.038 -11,688,689 46.21% 
27 -0.037 -11,334,486 46.32% -0.044 -13,459,702 45.63% 
28 -0.043 -13,105,499 45.75% -0.049 -15,230,716 45.06% 
29 -0.048 -14,876,513 45.17% -0.055 -17,001,729 44.48% 
30 -0.054 -16,647,526 44.60% -0.061 -18,772,742 43.91% 
31 -0.060 -18,418,540 44.02% -0.067 -20,543,756 43.33% 
32 -0.066 -20,189,553 43.45% -0.072 -22,314,769 42.76% 
33 -0.071 -21,960,567 42.87% -0.078 -24,085,783 42.18% 
34 -0.077 -23,731,580 42.30% -0.084 -25,856,796 41.61% 
35 -0.083 -25,502,593 41.72% -0.090 -27,627,810 41.03% 
36 -0.089 -27,273,607 41.15% -0.095 -29,398,823 40.46% 
37 -0.094 -29,044,620 40.57% -0.101 -31,169,836 39.89% 
38 -0.100 -30,815,634 40.00% -0.107 -32,940,850 39.31% 
39 -0.106 -32,586,647 39.43% -0.113 -34,711,863 38.74% 
40 -0.111 -34,357,661 38.85% -0.118 -36,482,877 38.16% 
41 -0.117 -36,128,674 38.28% -0.124 -38,253,890 37.59% 
42 -0.123 -37,899,688 37.70% -0.130 -40,024,904 37.01% 
43 -0.129 -39,670,701 37.13% -0.136 -41,795,917 36.44% 
44 -0.134 -41,441,714 36.55% -0.141 -43,566,931 35.86% 
45 -0.140 -43,212,728 35.98% -0.147 -45,337,944 35.29% 
46 -0.146 -44,983,741 35.40% -0.153 -47,108,957 34.71% 
47 -0.152 -46,754,755 34.83% -0.159 -48,879,971 34.14% 
48 -0.157 -48,525,768 34.25% -0.164 -50,650,984 33.56% 
49 -0.163 -50,296,782 33.68% -0.170 -52,421,998 32.99% 
**Population figures based on the 2010 census.100 
100.  Id. 
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APPENDIX III 
The formulas appearing in Part III may be derived in the following 
manner: 
Let B be the number of electors from b states and L be the number of 
electors from the remaining states. The District of Columbia has three 
electors regardless of population. For all integers such that 1 ≤ 𝑖𝑖 ≤ 50, 
let Pi be the population of State i and P be the total population of the 50 
states. Let Ri be the number of representatives to which State i is entitled. 
For all i, State i has 2 + Ri electors. ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = 43550𝑖𝑖=1  by law and the District 
of Columbia has three electors regardless of population. Any b states can 
outvote the remaining states and D.C. if 𝐵𝐵 > 𝐿𝐿 + 3. If D.C. votes with the 
B group, then the B group can outvote the remaining states if 𝐵𝐵 + 3 > 𝐿𝐿. 
Because the disadvantage created by the electoral system is at its 
maximum when the B group does not include D.C., we will derive the 
formula only for that scenario and note that the derivation is identical for 
the other except that instead of 𝐵𝐵 > 𝐿𝐿 + 3 in the first step the derivation 
would begin with 𝐵𝐵 > 𝐿𝐿 − 3. 
Let 𝐵𝐵 > 𝐿𝐿 + 3. Then 
2𝑏𝑏 +  �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
> �2(50 − 𝑏𝑏) + � 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖50
𝑖𝑖=𝑏𝑏+1
� + 3 
⇔  2𝑏𝑏 + �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
> 2(50 − 𝑏𝑏) + 3 + 435 −�𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
 
Because Congress has adopted proportional allocation, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 =  �435𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖� where 
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = [𝑥𝑥] is the Nearest Integer Function (that is, [𝑥𝑥] means x rounded to 
the nearest integer if x is not a whole number). Thus, 
𝐵𝐵 > 𝐿𝐿 + 3 ⇔  2𝑏𝑏 + ��435
𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖�
𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
> 2(50 − 𝑏𝑏) + 3 + 435 −��435
𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖�
𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
 
⇔  2��435
𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖�
𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
> 2(50 − 𝑏𝑏) + 3 + 435 − 2𝑏𝑏 
⇔  2��435
𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖�
𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
>  538 − 4𝑏𝑏 
⇔  ��435
𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖�
𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
>  269 − 2𝑏𝑏 
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(It may aid understanding to note that this last inequality is equivalent to 
saying it takes 270 electoral votes to win a presidential election). We want 
to be able to solve for ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖=1  in order to determine a population figure that 
guarantees the B group can prevail in the presidential election. 
Unfortunately, we cannot solve the inequality directly because [𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥] ≠ 𝑎𝑎[𝑥𝑥] 
when a is not a whole number and 𝑥𝑥 ≠ 0. But the nearest integer function 
is bounded, so we know the largest and the smallest the left-hand 
expression can be. This means we can proceed. For any real number x, 𝑥𝑥 −
1
2
≤ [𝑥𝑥] ≤ 𝑥𝑥 + 1
2
. Hence, for any positive integer n, ∑ �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� ≤  𝑥𝑥1 + 12 +  𝑥𝑥2 +𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1
1
2
+.  .  . + 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 + 12 =  𝑛𝑛2 +  ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1  and ∑ �𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗� ≥  𝑥𝑥1 − 12 −  𝑥𝑥2 −  12−.  .  .− 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛 − 12𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 = −𝑛𝑛
2
+ ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 . Thus, 
��
435
𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖�
𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
>  269 − 2𝑏𝑏 ⇔−𝑏𝑏2 + ��435𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖� < 269 − 2𝑏𝑏 <𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
 𝑏𝑏2 + ��435𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖�𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
 
This last step enables us to factor the coefficient 435/P out of the 
sum. Now we can solve for ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖=1  to determine a population figure that 
guarantees the B group can prevail in the presidential election. We are 
interested in the smallest population that will guarantee victory and the 
smallest population that could possibly control 270 electoral votes. 
Solving both sides, we see that 
−
𝑏𝑏2 + ��435𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖� < 269 − 2𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
 ⇔  ��435
𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖� < 269 − 2𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
+ 𝑏𝑏2
⇔  435
𝑃𝑃
�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 < 269 − 2𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
+  𝑏𝑏2
⇔  �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
< 𝑃𝑃435 �269 − 2𝑏𝑏 + 𝑏𝑏2� 
⇔�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
< 269𝑃𝑃435 − 2𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃435 − 𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃870 = 538𝑃𝑃870 − 3𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃870
and 
𝑏𝑏2 + ��435𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖� > 269 − 2𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
 ⇔  ��435
𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖� > 269 − 2𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
−  𝑏𝑏2
⇔  435
𝑃𝑃
�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 > 269 − 2𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
−  𝑏𝑏2
⇔  �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
> 𝑃𝑃435 �269 − 2𝑏𝑏 − 𝑏𝑏2� 
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⇔�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
> 269𝑃𝑃435 − 2𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃435 − 𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃870 = 538𝑃𝑃870 − 5𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃870
The bigger of the two solutions will ensure that the B group wins. 
Thus, the B group is guaranteed to win if its population is 538𝑃𝑃
870
−
3𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃
870
 or 
greater. A B group cannot win if its total population is less than 538𝑃𝑃
870
−
5𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃
870
. 
We can relate these numbers to a majority of the population by 
separating out P/2. The other addend will then be the maximum possible 
handicap created by the electoral system: 
�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖
𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖=1
> 538𝑃𝑃870 − 3𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃870 = 435𝑃𝑃870 + 103𝑃𝑃870 − 3𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃870 = 𝑃𝑃2 + �103 − 3𝑏𝑏870 � 𝑃𝑃 
�𝑷𝑷𝒊𝒊
𝒃𝒃
𝒊𝒊=𝟏𝟏
> 538𝑃𝑃870 − 5𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃870 = 435𝑃𝑃870 + 103𝑃𝑃870 − 5𝑏𝑏𝑃𝑃870 = 𝑃𝑃2 + �103 − 5𝑏𝑏870 �𝑃𝑃 
This means that the B group is guaranteed to win if its population 
exceeds 50% of the total U.S. population by �103−3𝑏𝑏
870
� 𝑃𝑃. Note that this 
“excess” is negative if and only if b > 34. No b states with a total 
population that falls short of a majority by more than �103−5𝑏𝑏
870
� 𝑃𝑃 can ever 
win. 
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APPENDIX IV – CHART DATA 
Table 1 
Rank State 2010 
Population101 
% of 
total 
b 
largest 
1 California 37,253,956 12.1% 12.1% 
2 Texas 25,145,561 8.2% 20.3% 
3 New York 19,378,102 6.3% 26.5% 
4 Florida 18,801,310 6.1% 32.6% 
5 Illinois 12,830,632 4.2% 36.8% 
6 Pennsylvania 12,702,379 4.1% 40.9% 
7 Ohio 11,536,504 3.7% 44.7% 
8 Michigan 9,883,640 3.2% 47.9% 
9 Georgia 9,687,653 3.1% 51.0% 
10 North Carolina 9,535,483 3.1% 54.1% 
11 New Jersey 8,791,894 2.9% 57.0% 
12 Virginia 8,001,024 2.6% 59.6% 
13 Washington 6,724,540 2.2% 61.7% 
14 Massachusetts 6,547,629 2.1% 63.9% 
15 Indiana 6,483,802 2.1% 66.0% 
16 Arizona 6,392,017 2.1% 68.1% 
17 Tennessee 6,346,105 2.1% 70.1% 
18 Missouri 5,988,927 1.9% 72.1% 
19 Maryland 5,773,552 1.9% 73.9% 
20 Wisconsin 5,686,986 1.8% 75.8% 
21 Minnesota 5,303,925 1.7% 77.5% 
22 Colorado 5,029,196 1.6% 79.1% 
23 Alabama 4,779,736 1.6% 80.7% 
24 South Carolina 4,625,364 1.5% 82.2% 
25 Louisiana 4,533,372 1.5% 83.7% 
26 Kentucky 4,339,367 1.4% 85.1% 
27 Oregon 3,831,074 1.2% 86.3% 
28 Oklahoma 3,751,351 1.2% 87.5% 
29 Connecticut 3,574,097 1.2% 88.7% 
30 Iowa 3,046,355 1.0% 89.7% 
31 Mississippi 2,967,297 1.0% 90.6% 
32 Arkansas 2,915,918 0.9% 91.6% 
33 Kansas 2,853,118 0.9% 92.5% 
34 Utah 2,763,885 0.9% 93.4% 
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35 Nevada 2,700,551 0.9% 94.3% 
36 New Mexico 2,059,179 0.7% 94.9% 
37 West Virginia 1,852,994 0.6% 95.5% 
38 Nebraska 1,826,341 0.6% 96.1% 
39 Idaho 1,567,582 0.5% 96.6% 
40 Hawaii 1,360,301 0.4% 97.1% 
41 Maine 1,328,361 0.4% 97.5% 
42 New Hampshire 1,316,470 0.4% 97.9% 
43 Rhode Island 1,052,567 0.3% 98.3% 
44 Montana 989,415 0.3% 98.6% 
45 Delaware 897,934 0.3% 98.9% 
46 South Dakota 814,180 0.3% 99.2% 
47 Alaska 710,231 0.2% 99.4% 
48 North Dakota 672,591 0.2% 99.6% 
49 Vermont 625,741 0.2% 99.8% 
50 Wyoming 563,626 0.2% 100.0% 
Total 
 
308,143,815 100.0% 
Table 2 
Rank State 2010 
Population102 
% of 
total 
b smallest 
50 Wyoming 563,626 0.2% 0.2% 
49 Vermont 625,741 0.2% 0.4% 
48 North Dakota 672,591 0.2% 0.6% 
47 Alaska 710,231 0.2% 0.8% 
46 South Dakota 814,180 0.3% 1.1% 
45 Delaware 897,934 0.3% 1.4% 
44 Montana 989,415 0.3% 1.7% 
43 Rhode Island 1,052,567 0.3% 2.1% 
42 New Hampshire 1,316,470 0.4% 2.5% 
41 Maine 1,328,361 0.4% 2.9% 
40 Hawaii 1,360,301 0.4% 3.4% 
39 Idaho 1,567,582 0.5% 3.9% 
38 Nebraska 1,826,341 0.6% 4.5% 
37 West Virginia 1,852,994 0.6% 5.1% 
36 New Mexico 2,059,179 0.7% 5.7% 
35 Nevada 2,700,551 0.9% 6.6% 
34 Utah 2,763,885 0.9% 7.5% 
33 Kansas 2,853,118 0.9% 8.4% 
102.  Id. 
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32 Arkansas 2,915,918 0.9% 9.4% 
31 Mississippi 2,967,297 1.0% 10.3% 
30 Iowa 3,046,355 1.0% 11.3% 
29 Connecticut 3,574,097 1.2% 12.5% 
28 Oklahoma 3,751,351 1.2% 13.7% 
27 Oregon 3,831,074 1.2% 14.9% 
26 Kentucky 4,339,367 1.4% 16.3% 
25 Louisiana 4,533,372 1.5% 17.8% 
24 South Carolina 4,625,364 1.5% 19.3% 
23 Alabama 4,779,736 1.6% 20.9% 
22 Colorado 5,029,196 1.6% 22.5% 
21 Minnesota 5,303,925 1.7% 24.2% 
20 Wisconsin 5,686,986 1.8% 26.1% 
19 Maryland 5,773,552 1.9% 27.9% 
18 Missouri 5,988,927 1.9% 29.9% 
17 Tennessee 6,346,105 2.1% 31.9% 
16 Arizona 6,392,017 2.1% 34.0% 
15 Indiana 6,483,802 2.1% 36.1% 
14 Massachusetts 6,547,629 2.1% 38.3% 
13 Washington 6,724,540 2.2% 40.4% 
12 Virginia 8,001,024 2.6% 43.0% 
11 New Jersey 8,791,894 2.9% 45.9% 
10 North Carolina 9,535,483 3.1% 49.0% 
9 Georgia 9,687,653 3.1% 52.1% 
8 Michigan 9,883,640 3.2% 55.3% 
7 Ohio 11,536,504 3.7% 59.1% 
6 Pennsylvania 12,702,379 4.1% 63.2% 
5 Illinois 12,830,632 4.2% 67.4% 
4 Florida 18,801,310 6.1% 73.5% 
3 New York 19,378,102 6.3% 79.7% 
2 Texas 25,145,561 8.2% 87.9% 
1 California 37,253,956 12.1% 100.0% 
Total 308,143,815 100.0% 
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Table 3103 
States won % of population represented 
Obama 26 63.6% 
Romney 24 36.4% 
Clinton 20 43.6% 
Trump 30 56.4% 
103.  See, 2016 Presidential Election, supra note 60. 
